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In her article Environmental Justice, Human Rights and the Global South, 
Professor Carmen Gonzalez expertly ties together very complex, and often 
controversial, strands of international law: the history of international law with its 
colonial underpinnings, the North-South divide, and environmental justice.  She 
discusses their interaction through the lens of “environmental human rights.” 
The article is divided into four parts: Part I defines “environmental justice” and 
Part II examines the colonial roots of environmental injustice.  Part III analyzes 
the role of international law in justifying the conquest of nature and of non-
European peoples; and Part IV identifies the limitations of the environmental 
human rights discourse as a means of addressing environmental injustice.  The 
writer concludes that although “the discourse of human rights possesses 
tremendous emancipatory potential, . . . human rights law and institutions are 
embedded in power relations that replicate colonial discourses (such as the savior-
savage narrative) and enable Northern states and transnational corporations to 
evade responsibility for their abuse of nature and of vulnerable states and 
peoples.”1 
While the leading cause of global environmental degradation is the decadent 
consumption of resources by the wealthiest inhabitants, Professor Gonzalez points 
out that, by contrast, the adverse impacts of such degradation are borne 
disproportionately by the planet’s most vulnerable populations in both the North 
and the South.2  Environmental justice struggles that take place in both groups are 
hindered by asymmetrical power balances in the global community that have roots 
in the imperial legacy of international law.3     
With decolonization after the Second World War, the composition of the UN 
became South-heavy, which led to the adoption of several principles that had a 
definite Southern flavor to them: self-determination, permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, the right to development, and differential treatment.4  Some of 
these principles have now become part of hard law governing environmental 
issues.  Yet, their adoption was fraught with controversy, as was the common 
heritage of mankind principle, which was promoted by Southern states to ensure 
that they benefit from the resources of the global commons despite the lack of 
sophisticated technology to exploit these resources themselves. 
Professor Gonzalez also challenges “the saviors” (the Northern states and their 
NGOs) and “the savages” (the Southern states) narrative of human rights, which 
 
1. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South, 13 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 151, 194 (2015). 
2. Id. at 154-55.  
3. Id. at 158-59. 
4. Id. at 166-67.  
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she contends does not take into account Northern states’ complicity in relation to 
conflicts in the South or the benefits that Northern states and transnational 
corporations derived from these conflicts.5  She stresses the need for the human 
rights discourse to address the deeper structural inequities that produce 
environmental injustice.  While the environmental human rights discourse holds 
promise for subordinated communities, the paper cautions about the drawbacks of 
the present human rights system: (a) false universalism that masks Northern 
domination; (b) failure to hold Northern states and transnational corporations 
responsible for human rights abuses in the South; (c) the challenge of collective 
human rights; (d) lack of redress for systemic harms; (e) treating symptoms rather 
than root causes; and (f) disregarding local conceptions of human dignity.6   
The breadth and the depth of the issues covered in the article are truly 
astounding.  It not only identifies the drawbacks of the present system, but also 
offers solutions to overcome them.  The paper is a significant contribution to the 
existing literature on environmental justice, “environmental human rights,” the 
North-South divide, and the colonial discourse.  I am honored to have been 
afforded the opportunity to suggest a few comments on the paper, some of which 
can form the basis of a new research agenda. 
First, the author discusses “environmental human rights” as a means of 
addressing environmental injustice, yet the term “environmental human rights”7 
does not have a universally accepted meaning under international law.  The nexus 
between the environment and human rights has been articulated by scholars in 
various ways—environmental rights,8 environmental procedural rights,9 a 
 
5. Id. at 170, 173-75. 
6. Id. at 173-93.  
7. See Roda Mushkat, Contextualizing Environmental Human Rights: A Relativist Perspective, 26 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2009) (noting that environmental human rights are inextricably linked 
to environmental justice and using the term "environmental human rights" in multiple ways—
extending human rights principles into the environmental realm, the narrow sense (anthropocen-
tric rights) and a more broader sense (ecological rights)). 
8. See Michael Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. An-
derson eds., 1996); Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471 (2007) (noting that there are three approaches to the nexus between 
human rights and the environment (using existing human rights to seek redress for environmen-
tal issues; using procedural rights; and recognition of a substantive right to a clean environment)). 
For a discussion of the emergence of a right to environment under international law, see Sumudu 
Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human 
Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65 (2002). 
9. For a discussion of these various terms, see Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches 
to Human Rights and the Environment, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371 (2003) and Dinah Shelton, 
Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental Rights Have Been Recog-
nized?, 35 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 129 (2006). 
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substantive right to a healthy environment,10 and using existing human rights to 
include environmental issues.11  Some refer to “greening” human rights as 
environmental human rights,12 while others refer to procedural rights as 
environmental human rights.13  Yet others refer to a substantive right to a healthy 
environment as environmental human rights.14  Legally, there is a considerable 
difference between these terms.  The most commonly used rights in litigation are 
environmental procedural rights—access to information, participation in the 
decision-making process, and access to remedies.15  They are part of international 
human rights law and crept into the environmental rights discourse through the 
environmental impact assessment process under national law.16  They are now 
codified in the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters17—the first time that these rights were explicitly recognized in hard law in 
relation to environmental issues.  Although a regional treaty, it allows accession by 
any UN member with the consent of the Meeting of Parties.18  Interestingly, the 
Aarhus Convention makes a clear link between procedural rights and a 
substantive right to a healthy environment: 
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person 
of present and future generations to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall 
guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation 
in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.19 
A related issue is the inter-generational equity principle, a cardinal principle of 
international environmental law.  While the paper addresses intra-generational 
 
10. Burger, supra note 9. 
11. See Boyle, supra note 8. 
12. See Karrie Wolfe, Greening the International Human Rights Sphere? Environmental Rights and 
the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, 9 APPEAL: REV. OF 
CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 45 (2003). 
13. See Boyle, supra note 8. 
14. It is generally accepted that contemporary international law does not recognize such a right. See 
Atapattu, supra note 8. 
15. These are also referred to as access rights. See THE ACCESS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.accessinitiative.org/about (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
16. Many national environmental laws include public participation as a component of the environ-
mental impact assessment process. See NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23-53 (2008). 
17. See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 51, available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. 
18. Id. at art. 19. 
19. Id. at art. 1. 
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equity and the ecological debt that Northern states owe towards Southern states in 
some detail, the current generation has created an even greater ecological debt 
towards future generations,20 essentially locking them in a cycle of environmental 
degradation and catastrophic weather events caused by climate change.  This is 
closely related to the profligate consumption of resources that the paper refers to.21  
Northern states’ path of unsustainable development has led to the current state of 
environmental degradation with some states even facing the prospect of extinction 
together with their culture, territory, and population.  This is the future that 
awaits the Small Island States and is another example of Northern domination not 
just of the present generation but of many generations into the future. 
Secondly, the paper highlights an important development—the adoption of 
rights of nature as embodied in the constitution of Ecuador.22  One of the criticisms 
of the rights discourse, as the paper itself recognizes, is that it is inherently 
anthropocentric.  The emerging trend toward recognizing rights of nature 
irrespective of its worth to human beings—a feature of international 
environmental law23 and of ancient civilizations and indigenous cultures—is an 
important development.  However, because these rights are new, it is not clear 
what their parameters are, who can bring a claim, what the remedies are, and 
whether the current human rights paradigm can even accommodate such rights. 
Thirdly, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights24 (so-called 
Ruggie principles) would have been insightful for the section on the need to hold 
multinational corporations accountable for their environmental/human rights 
violations.  These guiding principles provide a useful framework, albeit non-
binding, for imposing obligations on states to ensure that transnational 
corporations abide by certain core environmental and human rights standards.  
Despite criticisms25 these guiding principles may at a later date form the 
foundation for hard law, as many soft law instruments in the environmental field 
have done.  
 
20. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 163. 
21. Id. at 154. 
22. Id. at 186. 
23. For the ecocentric approach to environmental issues, see World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 
37/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/ 
a37r007.htm. 
24. U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Rep. of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-21-mar-
2011.pdf. 
25.   See Penelope Simon, International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountabil-
ity for Violations of Human Rights, 3 J. OF HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 5 (2012). 
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The language of rights is powerful.  It focuses attention on victims. It awards 
remedies. Thus, it is no wonder that everybody is scrambling to use the rights 
framework, whether that framework is suited to his or her claim or not.  While the 
human rights framework is ill suited for many environmental issues,26 it has been 
a useful tool to seek redress for victims of environmental damage.  Even if it 
obscures “the historic inequities that gave rise to anti-colonial struggles, the North-
South divide, and environmental injustice within and between nations,”27 it has 
been able to hold perpetrators accountable for their wrongdoings, to award redress 
to victims and to deter future damage, even if it is on a micro, individual level.28  In 
this sense, human rights have played an important role in relation to 
environmental issues.   The cracks in the human rights framework are visible 
because we have tried to apply an existing framework to a regime that was not 
intended for it.  We have pulled and pushed at the seams of the human rights 
framework to accommodate environmental issues, and to some extent this has 
worked.  Until international law recognizes a substantive human right to a healthy 
environment, the struggle to fit environmental issues within the existing 
framework of human rights will continue.  As Professor Gonzalez correctly points 
out, without addressing the underlying historic inequities, the current inequalities 
that have roots in the colonial history, and the disproportionate burden that 
marginalized communities bear in relation to global environmental problems, the 
human rights paradigm will not be able to effectively address environmental 
injustices in the world today. 
 
 
26. The pros and cons of using the human rights framework for environmental issues have been dis-
cussed by many writers. See Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 172-73. 
27. Id. at 173. 
28. The main reason for the individualistic nature of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurispru-
dence is the court’s use of Article 8 of the Convention on the rights to privacy and family life as the 
basis for vindicating environmental rights. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD 
ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1331 (4th ed. 2011). 
